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Abstract
Development of seismic protection system for design extension conditions (SPS DEC) is suggested for enhancing safe-
ty of operation of NPP located on the territories with unfavorable seismic conditions. The idea of the system consists 
of the creation of a network of seismic stations arranged at a certain distance from the NPP and equipped with data 
transmission system. In case of detection by seismic sensors of movements of the ground with magnitude of vibrations 
exceeding a certain preset value, seismic stations transmit over radio-channel a signal indicating exceedance of the 
setting before the seismic wave reaches the NPP. This allows initiating transition of the reactor to subcritical operation 
mode prior to the beginning of destruction of equipment and reactor building. Ensuring reliable protected communica-
tion is achieved by simultaneous use of three radio-channels arranged in accordance with TETRA, WiMAx and LTE 
standards, as well as by the application of appropriate cryptography, authentication and data protection methods for 
preventing data corruption. Analysis was performed for determining optimal distance between seismic stations and the 
NPP and optimal number of these stations was determined for the following two options of arrangement of seismic sta-
tions: radial arrangement surrounding the NPP and arrangement along the direction towards the place with the highest 
probability of earthquake incipience. Layout was suggested of multilevel majoritarian data processing for excluding 
false triggering of the system. Conclusions were formulated on the enhancement of safety of NPP operation and signif-
icant reduction of probability of emergency situations due to the generation of anticipatory signals to reactor shutdown 
systems in case of earthquakes with intensity exceeding maximum design earthquake.
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Seismic protection system, maximum design earthquake, reactor shutdown, seismic station, safety, VVER, data trans-
mission.
Prerequisites for the system 
development
Accident on the Fukushima-1 NPP in Japan and its conse-
quences demonstrated the necessity of revision of classic 
methods for ensuring safety of nuclear power plants and 
their protection from destructive effects of seismic activity 
(Novikova 2013, Hano 2011). In connection with the fact 
that NPP can be located on the territory with unfavorable 
seismic environment advancement of seismic protection 
system (SPS) is the promising direction of future develop-
ment of NPP monitoring and control systems aimed at the 
enhancement of safety of nuclear power plants.
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At present one of the directions of SPS development is 
the upgrading and expansion of networks of seismic stati-
ons (SS) for detection and registration of seismic impacts.
Seismic sensors installed on the basement plate of the 
reactor facility (RF) intended for continuous control of 
seismic impact on the NPP reactor facility and shaping 
discrete signal indicating the exceedance of the preset 
threshold of ground vibrations are included in the com-
position of SPS on the operated or constructed NPPs 
equipped with VVER reactor facilities. Seismic impacts 
in the form of earthquake shocks and vibrations of ground 
initiated both by natural causes and by artificial processes 
associated with human activities as well are examined. 
The natural causes may include tectonic, volcanic or land-
fall earthquakes, and explosions, filling water reservoirs 
or caving of mines refer to artificial causes.
As of today, equipment for NPPs under operation or 
construction equipped with VVER reactor facilities is se-
lected in such a way as to ensure its operability in case of 
maximum design earthquake (MDE) which is determined 
by the specific geological conditions existing on the NPP 
site. In such case the possibility of earthquake with higher 
intensity is not considered. In other words, following the 
currently accepted paradigm of SPS implementation the 
possibility is examined of incipience of design earthqua-
ke (DE) and MDE referred to the events of the Design 
Basic Conditions (DBC) level, while the probability of 
initiation of beyond-design basis accident in case of more 
massive earthquakes (i.e. events of the Design Extension 
Conditions, DEC level) is disregarded.
In accordance with accepted norms the probability 
of initiation of MDE amounts to 10-4 1/year (NP-031-01 
2001). Despite this the probability of initiation of such 
event requires examination, because it may have disas-
trous consequences.
Theoretical substantiation of seismic protection system 
for design extension conditions (SPS DEC) representing 
the network of seismic stations installed at a certain dis-
tance from the NPP and equipped with the system for 
transmitting along the dedicated radio-channels the sig-
nal initiating power unit shutdown which is performed by 
introducing neutron absorbing rods in the reactor core is 
given in the present study. Triggering the system is anti-
cipated in cases of incipience of earthquakes with intensi-
ties higher than that for MDE, i.e. in the conditions of ini-
tiation of events not identified by the design (DEC level).
The idea of creation of the network of remote seismic 
stations is exposed in (Heaton 1985). The suggested mo-
del of computer-based alarm system signaling seismic 
threat is intended for issuing warning signals to the NPP 
in case of incipience of massive earthquakes.
Composition of the system
Composition of the SPS DEC includes seismic sensors, 
modules for reception and processing of signals from 
seismic sensors at the seismic station, cable lines for 
transmitting signals from seismic sensors to seismic stati-
ons, device for transmission of radio-signals and module 
for signal reception and processing directly at the NPP.
Seismic sensors of the SPS DEC are installed radially 
at the distance of 5–10 m from seismic station at a certain 
depth underground in protected structures. Each seismic 
sensor includes three accelerometers for registration of seis-
mic impacts and shaping discrete emergency signals warn-
ing about the exceedance of the preset level of seismic load 
and discrete signal indicating functionality of the sensor. In 
case of detection of movement of the ground with magnitu-
de of vibrations in excess of a certain setting seismic stations 
transmit via radio-channels signal indicating the exceedan-
ce of the setting before the time moment when seismic wave 
reaches the NPP. This allows initiating conversion of reactor 
operation mode to subcritical state prior to the destruction of 
equipment and buildings. Shutting down of the power unit 
is implemented using technical means of the existing SPS.
Electricity supply of the seismic station is provided 
from external electric power supply grids or from solar 
panels and wind generators, as well as using batteries gua-
ranteeing standalone operation of the system during 24 
hours in case of disruption of external electricity supply.
For ensuring protection of the seismic station it is sug-
gested to install the building of the seismic station on seis-
mic protectors (Shustov et al. 2007). Shielded versions 
of cables, as well as flexible protective armor resistant 
against bending and tensile breaking can be applied for 
protection of communication lines.
Communication issues between 
NPP and seismic stations
Communication between NPP and seismic stations must 
be protected, it must possess high reliability and exclude 
initiation of false triggering. Ensuring reliability, as well 
as protection against false triggering is achieved by pa-
rallel use of three radio-channels organized in accordan-
ce with TETRA (Chivilev 2009), WiMAx (Sjuvatkin et 
al. 2005) and LTE (Tihvinskij et al. 2010) standards and 
technologies. Main technical characteristics of these stan-
dards are presented in Table 1.
Exclusion of false triggering is achieved by applicati-
on of multilevel majoritarian voting (Fig. 1). Majoritarian 
voting of input signal from seismic sensors is performed 
on the first level using “two out of three” logic. Majori-
tarian voting of signals received from the same seismic 
station via each of the three radio-channels is performed 
according to “two out of three” logic on the second level. 
SPS activating signals received from different seismic 
stations are subjected on the third level to majoritarian 
voting according to “two out on N” logic. Activation of 
SPS must take place only after reception of signals from 
two or more different seismic stations for excluding false 
triggering because of local external effects.
Protection of data transmitted through radio-channel is 
ensured using VPN technologies (Roslyakov 2006) with 
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application of cryptography, authentication and methods 
for data protection for preventing data corruption. One of 
the methods for protection of communications is the use 
of a set of protocols defined by the IP Security (IPsec) 
standard. Protocols of the IPSec standard are applied by 
such cryptographic algorithms as DES, TripleDES, AES, 
SHA, MD5 (Ljasin and San’kov 2005). Other standards 
can be applied as well for establishing communications.
Topology of arrangement of 
seismic stations
The main factor predetermining efficiency of the system 
is the higher rate of propagation of radio-waves as com-
pared to seismic waves. The criterion of efficiency in such 
case is the event of transition of the reactor to subcritical 
operation mode before the moment when seismic wave 
reached the NPP site.
For reactor facilities of VVER type the design time 
for insertion of CPS rods in the reactor core amounts, as 
a rule, to not more than 4 s. Total time available for re-
gistration of the earthquake, processing and transmission 
of the data to NPP, reception and processing emergency 
signal directly at the NPP, was well as time for shaping 
control action and operation of mechanisms must be not 
more than 2 s. Thus, time margin tlim from the moment 
of registration of the earthquake (reception of signal of 
exceedance of the established threshold value of move-
ment of the ground) until the moment when seismic wave 
reaches the NPP site must be not less than 6 s. In other 
words, removal of seismic stations and seismic sensors at 
longer distances away from the NPP must be such that the 
time needed for seismic wave for covering this distance 
will amount to not less than tlim = 6 s.
Intensity of earthquake I is the intensity of vibrations of 
the ground on the earth surface representing the destructive 
force of the earthquake. It depends on the magnitude (M), 
distance from the epicenter (S) and the depth of the earth-
quake source (H). Intensity of earthquake (in magnitude 
points) at the given point of the earth surface is determined 
by the following dependence (Gorishnij et al. 2009):
Table 1. Main technical characteristics of the applicable communication standards.
Communication standard TETRA WiMax LTE
Operating frequency 150 – 900 MHz 2 – 11 GHz 1.4 – 20 GHz
Range of action Up to 60 km Up to 50 km Up to 100 km
Data transmission rate Up to 28 kbit/s Up to 70 Mbit/s Up to 100 Mbit/s
Supplementary information Data scrambling is achieved in the form of digital pro-
cessing of low bit rate data stream which allows applying 
complex algorithms with high cryptographic immunity 
not impairing quality of recovered data 
Expanded capability of 
operation beyond direct 
visibility 
Optimal realization of 
required characteristics
Figure 1. Organization of communications between NPP and seismic station.
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Taking into account that mean value of MDE intensity 
is equal to seven and minimum depth of occurrence of the 
epicenter H = 30 km, we plot dependence M(S) of earth-
quake magnitude on the distance between the NPP and 
the epicenter for which intensity of the earthquake on the 
NPP site is equal to seven points (Fig. 2):
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Conclusion can be drawn from analysis of the obtained 
dependence that in the case of incipience of earthquake 
with magnitude equal to 9.5 (theoretically maximum va-
lue of magnitude) at the distance of 850 km from the NPP 
site vibrations will occur on the site corresponding to in-
tensity equal to seven points (postulated MDE).
Taking into account implementation of procedures 
for analyzing seismic threat during the selection of NPP 
construction site, subsequent analysis will be conducted 
by us taking into consideration incipience of the earth-
quake epicenter at the minimal distance of 100 km (SP 
151.13330.2012 2013).
In the examination of 850-kilometer zone of possible 
incipience of earthquake and uniform distribution of epi-
centers probability of incipience of earthquake within the 
100-kilometer zone is equal to
p = Sr=100/SR=850 = (pr2)/(pR2) = 1002/8502 = 0.014.
Mutual location of elements of the system, as well as 
distances between them are schematically shown in Fig. 
3. Since the distance between power units on the NPP site 
is much less than the distance from NPP to the seismic 
station, NPP site will be hereinafter treated by us as a 
point object. Let us note that separate data reception and 
processing modules are anticipated for each power unit at 
the NPP. Taking into account the necessity of ensuring the 
preset time margin the following condition of minimum 
efficiency of the notification system can be formulated:
Tlim = tS – tAH = (S – AH)/V,
where tS is the time needed for seismic wave to reach the 
NPP site; tAH is the time needed for seismic wave to reach 
the seismic station; V is the seismic wave velocity.
Figure 2. Dependence of magnitude of the earthquake on the 
distance to the NPP at which intensity of the earthquake on the 
NPP site is equal to seven points.
Figure 3. Simplified layout of mutual arrangement of SPS elements and epicenter of the earthquake: O is the nuclear power plant; A, D, 
B … are the seismic stations; H is the epicenter of the earthquake, r = OA is the distance from the NPP to the seismic station; S = OH is 
the distance from NPP to the epicenter of the earthquake; AH is the distance from the epicenter to the seismic station.
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Velocity of S-waves carrying the greatest energy of 
the earthquake equal to V  » 3.4 km/s is taken to be the 
velocity of the seismic wave V. Taking into account that 
AH = (r2 + S2 – 2rScosa)1/2 and a = 360°/n, where n is the 
number of seismic stations (for the case of uniform arran-
gement), we obtain
Tlim = [S – (r2 + S2 – 2rScos(360°/n))1/2]/V.
Solving quadratic equation we express r(n, S) from the 
above formula as follows:
r(n, S) = Scos(360°/n) + [2(S2cos(720°/n) + S2 –  
– 2V2tlim2 – 4SVtlim)]1/2/2.
Substituting the preset value of tlim = 6 s and V » 3.4 
km/s we obtain the dependence between the distance r 
from the NPP to the seismic station, distance S from the 
NPP to the epicenter of the earthquake and the number of 
seismic stations n. Graphs of this dependence are plot-
ted in Figure 4 for different numbers of seismic stations 
varying from 5 to 12. Adding n as the third dimension 
we obtain three-dimensional graph of dependence r(n, S) 
(Fig. 5).
Minimum distances from seismic station to the NPP 
are presented in Table 2 for different numbers of seismic 
stations. It follows from the table that the system consis-
ting of seven seismic station ensures the required time for 
issuing preliminary warning but, however, the required 
distance of the seismic station from the NPP r = 47.3 km 
is too large. In such case the system consisting of eight 
seismic stations ensures realization of the preset require-
ments at the distance of 34 km from the NPP. Increase of 
the number of seismic stations to more than eight does 
not produce significant effect on the time for preliminary 
notification but, however, expenditures on construction 
of additional seismic stations are significantly increased. 
Option of implementation of SPS DEC with arrangement 
Figure 4. Dependence of the distance between NPP and seismic 
station on the distance from NPP to epicenter of the earthquake 
for different numbers of seismic stations.
Figure 5. Three-dimensional graph of dependence of the distance from NPP to seismic station for different numbers of seismic 
stations.
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of equipment of seismic stations in the premises of posts 
of the automated radiation monitoring and control system 
(ARMCS) located at approximately the same distances 
from the NPP is possible in this case (Obukhov 2017).
The suggested solution can be varied depending on diffe-
rent input conditions of the design, customer’s requirements, 
geographical, geological and other conditions. For instance, 
the alternative method of arrangement of seismic stations 
is their arrangement along the direction of boundaries of li-
thospheric plates which is predetermined by higher proba-
bility of incipience of earthquake specifically within this 
area. Layout of such arrangement is represented in Fig. 6.
Let us determine the required distance r between the 
line along which seismic stations are arranged and the 
NPP, as well distance x between seismic stations ensu-
ring fulfillment of the condition tlim³ 6s. Taking into ac-
count that triggering the system is envisaged only upon 
reception of signals of exceedance of the setting from two 
seismic stations, calculation will be performed for the dis-
tance from the NPP to the seismic station equal to AH. Si-
milar to the calculation for radial arrangement of seismic 
stations minimal distance from the epicenter to the NPP 
S=100 km will be accepted. Then, taking into account that 
AH = [x2 + (S – r)2] 1/2, we express the distance x(r):
x(r) = [(S – tlim×V)2 – (S – r)2]1/2.
Dependence x(r) is presented in Fig. 7. Analyzing the 
dependence, we can draw conclusion that if seismic stati-
ons are arranged at the distance r = 24 km from the NPP 
it is sufficient to arrange them at the distance equal to 10 
km from each other for achieving the preset tlim. When 
the epicenter is located at the distance exceeding 100 km 
such arrangement will also satisfy the condition tlim ³ 6 s. 
Distance between seismic stations equal to 10 km allows 
excluding false triggering caused by local effects occur-
ring in the vicinity of the seismic station.
Comparative characteristics of the examined options 
of arrangement of seismic stations are given in Table 3.
Discussion and conclusions
Option is suggested in the present paper of the seismic 
protection system for design extension conditions which, 
in case of incipience of earthquake with intensity larger 
than that for postulated MDE, i.e. in the conditions of 
potential development of design-basis accident, will al-
low performing timely activation of shutdown systems of 
power unit of the NPP before seismic wave reaches the 
NPP site, which will allow excluding the possibility of 
disastrous consequences.
The following two options of arrangement of seismic 
stations around the NPP are suggested: radial around the 
NPP and along the direction towards the place with the 
highest probability of incipience of earthquake. For ful-
filling the efficiency criterion (tlim = 6 s) it is necessary 
to arrange 8 seismic stations around the NPP along the 
perimeter with radius equal to 34 km. In this case equip-
ment of seismic stations can be installed in the premises 
of ARMCS posts located at approximately the same dis-
tance from the NPP.
In the second case installation of three seismic stati-
ons arranged along the line parallel to the boundary of 
Table 2. Required minimum distance from seismic stations to NPP for different numbers of seismic stations.
Number of seismic stations (n) 5 6 7 8 9 10 12
Radius separating seismic station from NPP (r, km) –* –* 47.3 34.1 29.6 27.2 24.7
* It is impossible to ensure the correlation for tlim = 6 s for the number of seismic stations equal to n = 5 and n = 6 for the preset conditions
Figure 6. Arrangement of seismic stations along the direction of 
boundaries of lithospheric plates: O – NPP; A, B, C … – seismic 
stations; H – epicenter of the earthquake; r = OC – distance from 
the NPP to the line along which the seismic stations are located; 
S = OH – distance from NPP to the epicenter of the earthquake; 
x = AC is the distance between seismic stations.
Figure 7. Dependence of distance from the line along which 
seismic stations are arranged and distance between seismic sta-
tions corresponding to the preset tlim.
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lithospheric plates is sufficient for ensuring the preset 
time for generating preliminary warning signal. This 
line must be located at the distance equal to 24 km from 
the NPP with seismic stations arranged at the distance 
of 10 km from each other. This option of arrangement 
significantly reduces the number of constructed seismic 
stations but, however, NPP becomes in this case vulne-
rable to earthquakes with epicenter located along diffe-
rent directions.
It is evident that along with the above listed factors lay-
out of arrangement of seismic stations relative to the NPP 
must be determined individually for each specific case on 
the basis of analysis of different originally stipulated spe-
cifications of the project, customer’s requirements, geo-
graphical, geological and other conditions.
SPS DEC is a flexible system allowing incorporating 
any number of seismic stations, different topologies and 
different options of organization of data transmission net-
work. Application of meshed topology of the network 
differing from other types of architecture by enhanced 
reliability of communication is possible. Such reliabili-
ty is achieved due to the fact that every network node is 
connected with several other nodes and, simultaneously, 
each of the nodes can take upon itself implementation of 
functions of commutator for other nodes. The layout of 
data transmission suggested in the present paper has the 
following advantages:
– Simultaneous use of three protected data transmissi-
on protocols allows ensuring the required degree of 
protection of the network from unauthorized access. 
Since in order it is necessary for the perpetrator to si-
multaneously intrude two protected data communicati-
on channels for each seismic station in order to shape 
false signal activating the system, which is physically 
impossible to achieve. Seismic stations are equipped 
with modern security alarm equipment including moti-
on detection sensors.
– Application of majoritarian logic according to “two 
out of N” logic for shaping signal triggering reactor 
shutdown systems ensures protection from false trig-
gering due to the local effects such as heavy objects 
falling in the vicinity of the seismic station, passage 
of heavy trucks, railroad cars, etc. Use of information 
from motion detection sensors as part of the algorithm 
of system operation allows as well to prevent false trig-
gering of the systems in case of intentional local effects 
initiated by perpetrators within the zone of location of 
seismic stations.
– Application of majoritarian logic according to “two 
out of N” logic for input signals from seismic sensors 
and signals received from seismic stations through ra-
dio-channels ensures protection from false triggering 
initiated by individual failures of sensors and data 
transmission channels.
Potential individual failure in the data processing mo-
dule and in the data transmission module on one of seis-
mic stations will not disturb functioning of the SPS DEC. 
Seismic system transmits in real time signal to the NPP 
confirming operability of associated technical means. 
Alarm signaling failure of the seismic system is activated 
in the central control room of the NPP if the signal is lost. 
In such case maintenance personnel is promptly directed 
to the seismic station for eliminating causes of the failure. 
If, nevertheless, initiating events occur during this time 
period (i.e. earthquakes of appropriate force), they are 
registered by adjoining seismic stations ensuring imple-
mentation of functions of the SPS DEC within the time 
required for triggering preliminary alarm signal.
Installation of seismic stations on seismic protectors 
and laying cables to seismic stations inside flexible pro-
tected cable trays allow preserving functionality of the 
seismic station under loads exceeding loads developed 
during MDE. In case of break of electric power supply 
lines batteries installed on seismic stations guarantee 
standalone operation of the SPS DEC during the preset 
time period.
Based on the fact that functioning of the system under 
discussion is needed only in the conditions not anticipated 
by the NPP design and fraught with emergence of beyo-
nd-design basis accidents the system can be referred to 
the third safety class in pursuance with NP-001-15 (NP-
001-15 2015) or to Safety class 3 category in accordance 
with IAEA SSG-30 (SSG-30 2014). Application of equip-
ment of lower safety class as compared with safety class 
of the SPS for design-basis accidents allows softening 
requirements on the qualification of equipment with leads 
to significant reduction of expenditures on the realization 
of the system. It has to be noted that referring the system 
to the third class of safety does not exclude the use of 
wireless data transmission technologies.
Thus, conclusion can be drawn that the proposed seis-
mic protection system is the viable option not requiring 
heavy expenses for its realization and allowing signi-
ficantly enhancing safety of nuclear power plant due to 
timely signaling the beyond-design basis accidents initi-
ated by earthquakes with intensities exceeding the MDE.
Table 3. Comparative characteristics of the examined options of arrangement of seismic stations.
Type of arrangement Radial Along the direction towards the boundaries of lithospheric plates 
Required distance from the NPP, km 34 24
Number of seismic stations 8 3
Effective coverage of surface 360° Only along the direction towards potential location of the epicenter 
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